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Abstract This paper studies the role of the markup of price over marginal
cost for the transmission of scal policy shocks. We construct time series
of markups allowing for uctuations in capacity utilization and total factor
productivity and use an aggregate production function that is more general
than Cobb-Douglas. Including the constructed markup series in a panel vec-
tor autoregression with annual OECD data, we nd that a positive shock
to government spending substantially lowers markups while raising output,
consumption, real interest rates, and government debt. The positive output
response appears to result mainly from the positive reaction of capital utiliza-
tion rather than from the one of hours worked.
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1 Introduction
This paper empirically studies the role of the markup of price over marginal cost in the
macroeconomic transmission of shocks to real government spending for a panel of OECD
countries. Current macroeconomic policy debates have brought the question of the empir-
ical e¤ects of government spending to the forefront of attention. One aspect is the recent
debate about the existence and size of the scal multiplier on private spending (e.g. Barro
and Redlick, 2009, Hall, 2009), which is of obvious importance for the question whether a
scal stimulus is e¤ective in moving the economy out of recession. A large literature start-
ing with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) has attempted to estimate the e¤ects of shocks to
government spending on output and other variables from identied vector autoregressions
(see Perotti, 2007 for a survey). Apart from the size of the scal output multiplier, the
impact of scal shocks on other variables has received considerable attention, in partic-
ular private consumption, real interest rates and real wages, since the responses of these
variables may shed light on the empirical relevance of di¤erent theories of scal policy
transmission.
Recent studies have investigated the precise nature of the empirical transmission mech-
anism of government spending shocks. In particular, several authors have pointed at the
importance of the markup of price over marginal cost for understanding the e¤ects of scal
shocks. Hall (2009) argues that Keynesian features of scal policy transmission, i.e. a large
positive output multiplier and positive responses of private consumption and real wages
to increased government spending, rely on a negative relation of the markup of price over
marginal cost to the level of activity. The intuition is that only when the price-marginal
cost markup decreases in reaction to higher government spending, the resulting increase
in labor supply can materialize without a strong reduction in the real wage, or even with a
moderate real wage increase. Therefore, with a markup that is countercyclical conditional
on government spending shocks, there can be sizeable output multipliers of scal spending
that need not be accompanied by strong decreases in real wages or consumption, much as
the empirical evidence suggests. The same point is made by Bilbiie (2009).
In general, a countercyclical markup ratio is a feature of New Keynesian models with
sticky prices, but could also be implied by models with exible prices when the desired
markup changes in response to a shock. A model which assigns a central role to markups
for scal policy transmission has been presented by Ravn et al. (2007). In their setup,
the deep habits property of demand implies that a shock that leads to a positive output
response increases the importance of the non-price elastic component of demand, such that
the overall demand elasticity rises and the optimal markup desired by rms declines. Ravn
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et al. (2007) show that their model can explain empirically observed transmission e¤ects
of scal shocks if the markup that is implied by their estimated model declines su¢ ciently.
However, they also note that a natural question is whether in the data markups of prices
over marginal cost indeed fall in response to a positive innovation in government spending,
as required for our theoretical model to capture the observed increase in consumption and
real depreciation of the exchange rate. To our knowledge, there is no available SVAR
evidence documenting the response of markups to government spending shocks(Ravn et
al., 2007, p. 23; our emphasis).
Such direct evidence has since been presented by Monacelli and Perotti (2008), but
only for the US and, more importantly, based on the assumption that production is Cobb-
Douglas and that there is no endogenous cyclical utilization of production factors, such
that the markup is directly observable from the inverse of labors share in output. This is
similar to the construction of real marginal costs (the inverse of the markup) in Gali and
Gertler (1999). Monacelli and Perotti (2008) nd that in a VAR on aggregate US data
their markup measure  i.e. the inverse of the labor share  indeed declines following a
scal spending shock.
The central contribution of the present paper is that we construct direct measures of
the price marginal cost markups that do not rely on the Cobb-Douglas assumption and
allow for variable capacity utilization. We use rst order conditions from a standard opti-
mizing business cycle model to construct time series of markup measures and include them
as variables in a panel VAR model estimated using annual data for 19 OECD countries
ranging from 1970 to 2008. Generalizing the production function seems important, as
there is empirical evidence that the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital
is typically lower than one (see e.g. Antras, 2004, who presents evidence for the US, or
Chirinko, 2008). While allowing for a more general production technology is an obvious
advantage, the downside is that if production is not Cobb-Douglas the identication of
the markup ratio requires an estimate of the technology process. In principle, this could
be achieved using a measure of total factor productivity (the Solow residual). However,
the standard Solow residual is known to be biased in the case of monopolistic competi-
tion (Hall, 1991) and contaminated by unobserved uctuations in the degree of capacity
utilization. Increased utilization could erroneously be taken for an increase in total factor
productivity due to improved technology, and thus for an increase in the markup. One
therefore has to control for unobservable utilization.
To address this issue, we construct empirical measures jointly identifying the time
series of the markup, capacity utilization, and total factor productivity. The method is
similar to Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1999) and Basu et al. (2006), but while the
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latter authors use regression techniques to estimate a constant markup ratio, we follow
the former and use a calibration procedure that delivers the whole time series of the
markup. Our approach for controlling for utilization changes and their e¤ect on measured
technology change and the markup is similar to Imbs (1999) in that we use the rst order
conditions of a standard model in which the utilization of capital is a choice variable, as in
Greenwood et al. (1988) and a large subsequent literature. Other approaches to control
for cyclical utilization have been proposed by Basu (1996) by using materials input and
by Burnside et al. (1995) by using energy input as a proxy for utilization. Our method
provides a theoretically well-founded alternative that does not require access to data on
materials and energy use which is rarely available in a cross-country context.
The largest part of the previous literature on scal policy transmission uses data for the
US or a small number of additional countries like Canada, the UK, and Australia (see Per-
otti, 2005, 2007, Ravn et al., 2007, Pappa, 2009; an exception is Beetsma et al., 2008, who
use annual data to study the international transmission of scal shocks via trade balances).
The main reason for this choice is data availability, since quarterly time series of su¢ cient
length for scal variables are rarely available. In this paper, we use annual data for OECD
countries and estimate the e¤ects of scal shocks by using panel VAR techniques. Using
annual data has an obvious drawback concerning identication. The standard assumption
in the scal VAR literature (e.g. Perotti, 2007) is that government spending can be or-
dered rst in a recursive identication. This is plausible with quarterly or higher frequency
data, as lags in the planning and implementation of scal policy decisions can plausibly
be assumed to rule out any endogenous reaction of government spending to the state of
the business cycle within a quarter (the situation is more complicated when identication
of tax shocks is aimed at, which is not the case here). However, with annual data this line
of reasoning is arguably less compelling, as scal policy might well be changed during a
year in response to other shocks. Perotti (2007) points out that this may entail a negative
bias in the estimated responses of output and private consumption to scal shocks. In
response to an adverse business cycle shock, governments may increase spending within
the year to act countercyclically, which would mistakenly be interpreted as an instance of
negative output reactions to scal shocks by a recursive VAR. Unfortunately, it is not clear
whether governments typically adjust spending in a countercyclical fashion, such that the
direction of the possible bias is hard to predict. More generally, however, Beetsma et al.
(2010) argue that the bias in using a recursive VAR with government spending ordered
rst may well be negligible. These authors study the possible identication problem by
comparing VARs on annual and quarterly data where both frequencies are available. They
nd that the assumption of a zero response of government spending to output within a
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year is not rejected by the data. Therefore, they conclude that the recursive identication
is a sensible procedure even with annual data. The interpretation is that the budget is
set once a year and the variations within the year are comparatively small. Our empirical
identication approach uses this argument.
Using annual data has several advantages (beyond data availability). Favero and Gi-
avazzi (2007) argue that scal VARs are biased as long as the level of debt (in relation to
output), which is crucial for the long term scal sustainability, is not included. However,
data on government debt is usually only available over longer samples at annual frequen-
cies. Using annual data allows us to respond to Favero and Giavazzis (2007) argument
by including the debt to output ratio as a variable in our panel VARs.
The main results are as follows. We nd that markups do tend to decline following a
positive scal spending shock, although to a limited amount. Interestingly, the estimated
amount of markup reduction due to government spending shocks is remarkably close to the
theoretically implied size of markup reduction that Ravn et al. (2007) have to postulate
in order to be able to explain the empirical transmission mechanism of scal shock within
their model of variable markups due to deep habits. We point out that while the estimated
markup reaction quantitatively depends on calibrated parameters, the sign of the response
is robust for a broad range of parameters that spans virtually all practically relevant
parameter sets. In particular, the markup reacts most strongly negatively to a positive
government spending shock if the elasticity of substitution between e¤ective capital input
and labor in production is close to one, and if utilization does not vary strongly. This is
the setting used by Monacelli and Perotti (2008) who assume a Cobb-Douglas production
function and neglect changes in capacity utilization. Their work is thus, in the light of our
results, likely to overstate the countercyclical markup response to scal shocks. However,
there is still a sizeable and theoretically important estimated markup reduction even in
the case of our preferred specication of limited short-run capital-labor substitutability
and more highly variable capacity utilization.
We further establish that changes in capacity utilization seem to be a major channel of
adjustment following scal shocks. While the estimated responses of output and private
consumption are positive and quantitatively in line with previous studies, we also nd that
the estimated response of hours worked is weak and barely positive. This makes it di¢ cult
to explain the sizeable output response through the standard wealth e¤ect on labor supply
that is operative in conventional models. The positive output reaction is initially several
times stronger than the response of hours, which seems puzzling given decreasing returns
to labor. However, we show that variable capacity utilization seems to go a long way
toward explaining this apparent contradiction, since utilization reacts strongly positively
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on impact.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 briey describes the data set used,
with a more detailed discussion deferred to the appendix, and outlines the empirical strat-
egy. Section 3 presents the construction of the markup and utilization series used in the
subsequent estimates. Section 4 presents empirical results and section 5 concludes.
2 Data and econometric approach
We estimate panel VARs using annual data for 19 OECD countries for the period 1970
to 2008. The source of data is mostly the European Commissions AMECO database,
while interest rate data are from the IMFs International Financial Statistics and hours
worked (which are needed in the markup calculations) are from the Groningen Growth
and Development Centre. The data is measured at the aggregate level of each country;
the countries included are those OECD members for which the data are available over the
whole time span of the sample period; see the appendix for details.
We employ both directly observable and constructed variables. The baseline set of
variables consists of real (deated with the gdp price index) government consumption
spending per head of population gt, real gdp per head of population yt, real private con-
sumption expenditures per head of population ct, a real interest rate Rt (constructed as
the nominal interest rate on long-term government bonds less the rate of change in the
gdp deator), and the government debt-to-output ratio dt (constructed as the general
governments consolidated gross debt as a percentage of gdp at market prices). The VARs
are identied recursively with government spending ordered rst. This reects the com-
mon assumption (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, Perotti, 2007) that government spending
does not react endogenously to the state of the economy within the period, but only with
a lag. While this assumption is rarely debated in the context of VARs using quarterly
data, it is less uncontroversial when annual data is used. However, Beetsma et al. (2010)
report evidence for cases where both quarterly and annual data are available that the bias
entailed by assuming government spending to be exogenous within the year might well be
negligible.
Additionally, we use the price marginal cost markup t, and the rate of capacity
utilization ut, which are unobservable in principle but can be constructed to follow from
optimizing rst order conditions through a calibration approach based on Rotemberg and
Woodford (1991, 1999) in a way discussed in detail in the next section. Furthermore, some
of the specications also make use of total hours worked ht.
To control for cross-country unobserved heterogeneity, the panel VARs include country
5
xed e¤ects. Moreover, all estimations discussed in this paper control for time e¤ects. For
dynamic panel data models, it is well-known that the simple xed e¤ects estimator is
not consistent for a nite time dimension, see Nickell (1981). Since the associated bias
decreases in the number of time periods, a practical question is whether the number of
time periods available in our study (T = 39) is su¢ ciently large to make the bias neglible.
In Juessen and Linnemann (2010), we have compared the perfomance of various estimation
techniques for panel VARs estimated from macro data. We nd that, for datasets having
similar dimensions as the one used in the present study, the bias of the simple xed e¤ects
estimator can still be substantial (also see Judson and Owen 1998 for related single-
equation evidence). In Juessen and Linnemann (2010) we suggest that bias-corrected
versions of the xed e¤ects estimator are the estimators of choice when estimating panel
VARs from macro data. Specically, we show that the Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002) bias-
corrected xed e¤ects estimator yields almost unbiased estimates. Accordingly, we use this
estimation technique for the present estimation problem. For the sake of completeness,
we will present a comparison of results (see appendix A.4) obtained using the simple xed
e¤ects estimator and our preferred estimation technique, the Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002)
estimator.
To make the Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002) estimator suitable for models with higher
order VAR dynamics (we use two lags), one can use the fact that any VAR(p) process
can be written in VAR(1) form by imposing blockwise zero and identity restrictions on
the VAR slope coe¢ cients, see e.g. Lütkepohl (2006, p. 15 and p. 194) and also Hahn
and Kuersteiner (2002, p. 1640). We therefore use an extended version of the Hahn and
Kuersteiner (2002) estimator that allows for linear constraints. To control for time e¤ects,
we use a projection matrix to average the observations over individuals and then use the
transformed data in the estimations (which is equivalent to including the matrix of time
dummies as regressors). Finally, as in Beetsma, Giuliodori, and Klaassen (2006, 2008), we
control for linear country-specic time trends.
3 Markup construction
The approach used to construct time series of the price marginal cost markup t and the
rate of capital utilization ut is based on Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1999). The
approach is also similar to Basu et al. (2006), but the di¤erence is that these authors
estimate a constant markup as a regression parameter, while we identify a time series
of variable markup ratios based on postulating specic values for some structural model
parameters. To construct series for the markup, we use a standard optimizing business
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cycle model with monopolistic competition and endogenous utilization of capital (similar
to e.g. Christiano et al., 2005, or Justiniano et al., 2009). Note that only the static
intratemporal rst order conditions of the model are needed for the procedure to construct
markups and utilization rates. This is clearly an advantage, since the most controversial
aspects of macroeconomic models pertain to the intertemporal optimality conditions, like
consumption Euler equations. These are not needed here at all, such that the proposed
empirical strategy would be valid not only in the specic simple model used here, but
also in a wider class of models which might di¤er greatly with respect to their predictions
concerning dynamics. Note that we also do not make use of optimizing conditions with
respect to labor supply, which are also highly controversial; our method should thus be
robustly valid in many labor market models.
Households have a concave period utility function v(ct; nt), where ct is private con-
sumption and nt is labor supply (hours), and maximize
E0
1X
t=0
tv(ct; nt),  2 (0; 1);
subject to the ow budget constraint
wtnt + rtutkt + t = ct + it + a(ut)kt;
where wt and rt are the real wage and capital rental rates, respectively, kt is the capital
stock, t is residual rm prots, and it is investment. The variable ut > 0 is the endogenous
degree of utilization of capital and the function a(ut) determines the resource costs of
utilization per unit of capital (a specication widely used in the literature, e.g. Christiano
et al. 2005, Justiniano et al. 2009). It is assumed that
a(ut) =

1 +  
u1+ t , ;  > 0:
Here,  = 00u=0 measures the costliness of varying utilization; it is thus an inverse index
of the variability of utilization in equilibrium. The capital accumulation constraint is given
by
kt+1 = (1  )kt + it;
where  2 (0; 1) is the constant depreciation rate.1
1We also experimented with a more general version where labor e¤ort is variable and total labor input
nt is decomposed as nt = mthtet with mt employment, ht per capita hours, and et labor e¤ort. As in
Basu et al. (2006), then, under certain conditions labor e¤ort can be shown (from the households rst
order conditions) to be uniquely related to per capita hours. The results of these experiments showed that
robustly (i.e. for all parameters that govern the relationship between per capita hours and e¤ort that we
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The household rst order conditions for nt, ct, and ut are (letting subindices denote
partial derivatives)
wt =  unt=uct; (1)
uct = Etuct+1 [rt+1ut+1 + 1     a(ut+1)] ; (2)
rtkt = a
0(ut)kt = u
 
t kt: (3)
The rm sector is characterized by a continuum of rms indexed on i 2 [0; 1] each pro-
ducing a variety of the output good and engaged in monopolistic competition. The i-th
rms demand is assumed to be
yit = p
 "t
it yt;
where yit is individual output, yt is aggregate output, pit is the relative price of the i-th
good in terms of the general price level, and "t > 1 is the possibly time-varying absolute
value of the elasticity of demand. The technology is
yit = ztF (uitkit; nit); (4)
where F (:) is a production function with the usual neoclassical properties and zt is the
level of technology. We assume constant returns to scale of the function F (:) in its two
arguments uitkit and nit. The rm chooses employment nit and utilized capital uitkit to
maximize prots, taking aggregate output, technology, and real factor prices as given.
Introducing the markup
t =
"t
"t   1 ;
we can write the rst order conditions that describe a symmetric equilibrium (in which each
rm chooses the same factor inputs and charges the same price, such that the individual
rm index can be dropped) as
ztF2 = twt; (5)
ztF1 = trt; (6)
where F1  @F (uitkit; nit)=@(uitkit) and F2  @F (uitkit; nit)=@(nit).
Now consider the equilibrium conditions (3), where we can substitute out the di¢ cult
tried) the response of per capita hours to government spending shocks is rather at. This also implies
that labor e¤ort does not contribute signicantly to the responses. We therefore proceed with the simpler
version where labor input is measured in terms of hours and there is no variable e¤ort.
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to observe rental rate of capital through (6), (5), and the symmetric version of (4) which
reads yt = ztF (utkt; nt). These are three equations in the eight endogenous variables
kt; ut; t; nt; yt; wt; zt. Our strategy is to treat nt; kt; yt; wt as observable variables and
to use data on these as well as the information embodied in the aforementioned equilib-
rium conditions to empirically determine implied time paths of the unobservable variables
t; zt; ut.
We do so via a log-linear approximation along a balanced growth path; the appendix
gives the details of the calculations. Denote for any variable xt its constant value on the
balanced growth path by a variable without time subscript, x, and the log-deviation asbxt = ln(xt=x). The log-deviations of the markup, utilization, and technology can then be
recovered as (see appendix)
0BB@
butbtbzt
1CCA =
0BB@
 sK 1  1
sL
 +  1  1
sK 0 1
1CCA
 10BB@
0  sK sK  1
0 sL  sL 0
1  sL  sK 0
1CCA
0BBBBB@
bytbntbktbwt
1CCCCCA ; (7)
where sK and sL are the shares of capital and labor along the balanced growth path and
 is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the production function.
For the empirical work, we thus need byt; bnt;bkt; bwt, which we calculate as log-deviations
from deterministic linear trends (using quadratic time trends did not change the results
much). Further, we need a choice of constants for the steady state parameters ; ;  ; and
sL (whence sK = (1  sL) = follows from constant returns to scale). This enables us to
nd the time path of the deviations but; bt; bzt from which the levels can be recovered, e.g.
t = exp(bt)  , once constant steady state levels for u; ; z are given.
We apply this procedure for each country in the data set separately, such that we get
time series t; ut; zt for each individual country. Since information on empirically realistic
calibration values for the constant parameters is scarce for countries other than the US,
we choose the same parameter set for all countries. For the average markup , we use
the value 1:2 which is commonly used in the business cycle literature based on results
by Basu and Fernald (1996) for the US. The labor income share is set to the customary
value sL = 2=3. The crucial parameters that remain are the elasticity of capital-labor
substitution  and the elasticity of the depreciation cost with respect to utilization  . In
most studies, such as Monacelli and Perotti (2008) or Basu et al. (2006), a Cobb-Douglas
assumption implicitly restricts  to one. One of the main advantages of the procedure
followed here is that we can relax this restrictive assumption. Antras (2004) nds that, for
the US, the typical elasticity of capital-labor substitution lies between 0.6 and 0.9, while a
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part of his various estimates suggest that it could even be well below 0.5. Chirinko (2008)
surveys the literature estimating the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor
and concludes that the elasticity is in the range of 0.4 to 0.6 and that, consequently, there
is little evidence to sustain the assumption of a CobbDouglas production function. We
thus choose  = 0:5 as our benchmark value and report the sensitivity of the estimates
when the markup series is constructed using other values for .
The parameter  is even more di¢ cult to pin down empirically. Note that in the limit
if  gets large, the model collapses to one without a utilization margin, whereas a low
value of  implies low costs of varying capital utilization, such that measured utilization
would be highly variable over the business cycle. The latter is indeed found by studies
which estimate this parameter in the context of full scale empirical DSGE models, e.g.
Christiano et al. (2005). Baxter and Farr (2005) use a baseline value of 1, based on
estimates in Basu and Kimball (1997), but also note that these authors report very wide
condence intervals that do not rule out innitesimally small values of  . Jaimovich and
Rebelo (2009) use  = 0:15, but also point out that existing literature gives little guidance
in this choice and hence conduct a sensitivity analysis. Given the uncertainty surrounding
the choice of this parameter, we (somewhat arbitrarily) choose  = 1 as a benchmark, and
report a sensitivity analysis of the VAR results for the case of highly variable utilization
( = 0:01) as well as almost constant utilization ( = 10). The steady state values of
utilization ut and of technology zt are normalized to one without loss of generality.
Figures 5 and 6 (see appendix A.3) display the markup series constructed in this way
for the benchmark parameter set with  = 0:5 and  = 1 for all 19 countries in the data
set. Note that while the level of the average markup is imposed a priori, the uctuations
visible in the gures are not. As a preliminary step, we can thus use our estimates to
comment on the long standing question whether markups are (unconditionally) counter-
cyclical over the business cycle (see Rotemberg and Woodford, 1992, 1999, Hall, 2009). In
our sample, the median correlation of the markup series with linearly detrended output
is  0:28; in 7 out of the 19 country cases we nd a weakly procyclical behavior of the
markup. The countercyclicality of the markup becomes somewhat weaker if we choose the
scenario of high variability in capital utilization ( = 0:01), where the median correlation
between the markup and detrended output drops to  0:21: In the case of low variability
in capital utilization ( = 10) the median correlation is  0:27. Thus, we conclude that
some modestly countercyclical markup behavior seems to be present in our sample.
However, the question whether the markup is unconditionally countercyclical is ar-
guably less important in our context than its conditional correlation with output in re-
sponse to scal shocks. Thus, in the next section, we proceed by using the markup series as
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variables in a scal VAR to shed light on the conditional variation in markups in the pres-
ence of government spending shocks, and thus on their role in the transmission mechanism
of scal policy.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline panel VAR
The baseline panel VAR consists of real per capita government spending gt, real per capita
gdp yt, real per capita private consumption ct, the markup series constructed above t,
the ex-post real interest rate (deated with the gdp price index log-change) on long-term
government bonds Rt, and the ratio of government debt to gdp dt; more detailed data
denitions can be found in the appendix. As the construction of the markup ratio uses a
loglinearization procedure, we allow for country-specic di¤erences in the balanced growth
paths by entering the variables in the form of log-deviations from linear trends (though
it should be noted that all results reported below are robust to using the log-levels of
the variables). Throughout, we set up the panel VARs with two lags of each endogenous
variable, and include country xed e¤ects as well as a matrix of time dummy variables.
Note that alternatively using either only one lag, or three lags, of the endogenous variables
did not change the results by much. Identication relies on ordering government spending
rst for the Cholesky decomposition that delivers the structural scal policy shock, as
customary in the the empirical literature (e.g. Perotti, 2007); see the introduction for a
discussion of this standard approach in the current context.
Figure 1 shows impulse responses to a one percent shock to government spending in the
baseline panel VAR (with 90% bootstrapped condence bands). The panel VAR is esti-
mated using the bias-corrected xed e¤ects estimator developed by Hahn and Kuersteiner
(2002). For the sake of completeness, appendix A.4 presents the corresponding results
obtained using the standard xed e¤ects estimator. This estimator is known to have a
negative bias (see Juessen and Linnemann, 2010). In the present context, the impulse re-
sponses from simple xed e¤ects estimates are still reasonably close to the bias-corrected
ones, but the responses are more short-lived than under bias correction.
The gure shows that scal shocks tend to raise government spending rather persis-
tently, as commonly found in the literature. There is a signicantly positive impact re-
sponse of real gdp and a slightly weaker positive reaction of private consumption. Again,
this result is to be expected from previous studies. The size of the scal multplieron
output is similar to what has been reported elsewhere: the impact e¤ect of a one percent
shock to government spending is to raise gdp by about 0:11 percent, which evaluated
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a one percent shock to government spending
at the sample mean ratio of government spending to output of 0:19 translates into an
increase of 0:58 units of gdp per unit increase in government spending. This is very close
to the corresponding value of 0:52 found by Ravn et al. (2007) in their four country panel
VAR with quarterly data for Australia, Canada, the UK and the US. An output multi-
plier of around 0:5 is also found by Hall (2009) for the US using only military government
spending (as the arguably most exogenous component of total government spending) as
the impulse variable.
The debt to output ratio increases strongly and very persistently following a surge in
government spending. This can be viewed as saying that government spending is typically
decit nanced in the short run. However, over time the budget is adjusted in order to
keep the build-up of debt under control, such that the debt to output ratio shows some
mean reversion over the longer run. Note that Favero and Giavazzi (2007) argue that scal
VARs are biased if no measure of debt is included, since the estimation of the adjustment
process should allow for the interactions induced by the presence of the government budget
constrained. Thus, including debt to output ratios can be seen as a way to avoid these
problems (though leaving out the debt ratio does not change any of the other results
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fundamentally).
Moreover, gure 1 shows a marked but short-lived increase in the real bond interest
rate. This is in contrast to some of the previous literature, which typically nds weak
reactions of interest rates to scal shocks (e.g. Corsetti and Müller, 2006). The reason
could be due to di¤erences in the empirical measures of interest rates used and in the
extended country sample analyzed here. If we include the nominal government bond
interest rate and the gdp ination rate separately in the VAR (instead of using a real
interest rate measure), we get an almost at response of the nominal interest rate and a
decrease in ination in response to a government spending shock. However, the responses
of the other variables are not much a¤ected by the choice of the interest rate measure,
such that these empirical choices do not turn out to be crucial for the results that are the
center of the focus here.
Most importantly, namely, we nd that a positive shock to government spending leads
to a signicant reduction in the markup t. The impact response is  0:27, though the
e¤ect dies out fairly rapidly and markups return to normal within a few years. This central
result has turned out to be robust to all variations that we investigated, like modest changes
in the sample size, the number of countries covered, the choice of variables entering the
panel VAR, and adding or deleting lags. Further robustness checks with respect to the
postulated parameter values used to construct the markup series are presented in the
following subsection. We are thus condent that scal expansions indeed tend to reduce
price marginal cost markups.
This result is interesting in the light of recent debates surrounding the precise nature of
the transmission process of government spending shocks. Hall (2009) argues that substan-
tial output multipliers of government shocks can only be explained through countercyclical
markup behavior. The reason is that with a constant markup, the additional labor in-
put set forth by higher government spending through the usual wealth e¤ect reduces the
real wage due to decreasing returns to labor. This limits the amount of the equilibrium
increase in labor. As a consequence, the output multiplier will be small, and likely too
small to allow for an increase in consumption. If, on the other hand, the markup of price
over marginal cost declines when a positive scal shock occurs, rms are willing to hire
more labor at any given real wage rate, since the economy has e¤ectively become more
competitive. The resulting boost to labor demand limits the real wage decrease, or even
allows for an increase in real wages, which may also give room to a positive response of
consumption.
This theoretical argument is supported by the estimates presented in gure 1, which
brings direct evidence that this line of reasoning seems to be consistent with empirical
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observations. Moreover, the substantial markup decline is well in line with the theoretical
implications derived from the model of variable markups presented by Ravn et al. (2007).
In their model, there is a non-price elastic component of goods demand, since consumers
have consumption habits with respect to individual goods. An exogenous surge in scal
spending then increases the relative importance of the price elastic component of demand,
such that the overall price elasticity of demand rises and the markup declines. Ravn et
al. (2007) estimate the parameters of their model by matching the theoretical impulse
responses of their model to the empirical ones obtained from a four country panel VAR
using government spending, output, consumption, the trade balance, and the real exchange
rate as variables. They then show that their model, when evaluated using the estimated
parameter values, implies that the markup ratio which they treat as unobservable 
must decrease in response to a positive government shock. More specically, they state
that "in response to a one-percent increase in domestic government spending, markups
in domestic markets fall by 26 basis points on impact" (p.21). Note that this theoretical
implication of their model is very close to the empirical nding we present here. Our
results thus can be seen as providing independent evidence for their view of the scal
transmission mechanism, since the theoretically implied markup behavior of their model
is empirically supported by our direct estimates of the markup ratios. Of course, this does
not rule out that other theories that rely on countercyclical markup behavior in response
to government shocks might be the root of the empirical results presented here.
4.2 Robustness of the markup response
Our nding that markups are conditionally countercyclical in response to government
spending shocks depends, of course, on the validity of the procedure used to construct the
unobservable markup series. In particular, we have postulated values for the elasticities
that explain how the empirical markup measure follows from the observable time series on
output, employment, capital, and real wages. Some of these parameters are controversial.
In particular, the cost elasticity of the utilization rate  is neither easy to pin down
empirically, nor is there a standard calibration value used in the literature. Therefore, in
this section we assess the robustness of the results with respect to di¤erent assumptions
concerning parameters. In the next subsection, we analyze the behavior of the implied
utilization rate series ut itself.
Figure 2 shows that the size of the initial markup response to a scal shock depends on
the assumptions concerning the variability of capacity utilization. In particular, postulat-
ing a low elasticity  implying low costs to varying utilization and therefore more volatile
utilizationleads one to conclude a more muted markup response (see the dashed lines in
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Figure 2: Markup responses for di¤erent elasticities of capacity utilization
gure 2), while the strongest markup response results if utilization is almost constant (see
the dotted lines in gure 2). However, for all of these specications, the markup response
remains strongly negative, such that none of the qualitative conclusions depends on ones
particular prior with respect to the parameter  . Models that do not take into account
the variability of the utilization rate, like Monacelli and Perotti (2008), are therefore likely
to overstate the amount to which the markup declines in response to a scal shock.
Next, gure 3 shows the markup response to a scal shock for di¤erent values of
the elasticity of substitution  (keeping  equal to its baseline value of one). For an
elasticity of substitution closer to the Cobb-Douglas case of one (see the dotted line in
the gure drawn for  = 0:85) the markup response is more strongly negative. However,
qualitatively, the result of a markedly negative response is unaltered even for the more
realistic (in the short run) specication of a lower elasticity of substitution. Overall, these
results suggest that a countercyclical markup response does not seem to be a gment of
specic parameter choices, but appears to be a robust feature of the data for a wide range
of plausible parameters.
4.3 Utilization and hours
Until now, we have concentrated on the markup response to scal shocks. However, while
we argue that the markup is an important element in understanding the scal transmission
process due to its impact on labor demand, it is also worthwhile to consider the supply
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Figure 3: Markup responses for di¤erent elasticities of substitution in production
side responses in more detail. Therefore, we now add to the basic panel VAR one at
a time  total hours worked (in log-deviations from trend) and capacity utilization (as
constructed in section 3). Figure 4 shows the responses of these variables to a one percent
shock to government spending, using the baseline parameterization for the construction
of the utilization rate series.
As can be seen in the left panel of gure 4, hours worked respond weakly and only
initially positive (although neither the initial positive nor the later negative response is
signicant at the 90% condence level). This result is somewhat surprising, at rst sight
because, as shown before and in a large previous literature, the output response is markedly
positive. This raises the question how the additional output that follows a scal expansion
is actually produced, given that capital is predetermined in the short run and labor input
responds so weakly. Put di¤erently, scal shocks seem to have a strongly positive short-run
e¤ect on labor productivity.
The likely explanation of this nding can be seen in the right panel of gure 4, which
shows the response of the utilization rate series that has been constructed along with
the markup series. The utilization rate responds strongly positively to the government
spending shock, with an impact e¤ect about the same magnitude as the output response.
This suggests that the positive output multiplier of scal shocks is to a large extent due
to rms responding by increasing capacity utilization, not labor input. Again, though
not shown here, these results are qualitatively very robust to variations in parameters
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of hours worked and capacity utilization
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used. Note that while an hours response that is weaker than the output response is a
typical nding in the earlier literature, this aspect of the e¤ect of scal shocks has not
been discussed much so far. Our nding thus suggests that cyclical capacity utilization is
an important element in the scal transmission process.
Arguably, this also casts a di¤erent light on the discussion of the size of the government
output multiplier from the point of view of stabilization policy. If countercyclical govern-
ment spending is to be used to stabilize the economy, the e¤ect on employment might well
be negligible even if the output multiplier is substantial, since most of the output e¤ect
seems to come from increases in utilization.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to present direct evidence for the behavior of markups
of price over marginal cost in response to government spending shocks. The reaction of the
markup is important from a theoretical point of view, as several authors have argued that
the available empirical evidence on the transmission of scal shocks can only be understood
if the markup responds negatively to an increase in scal spending. It is thus natural to
look for direct empirical evidence on markup changes following scal expansions.
Since the markup is not directly observable, the main empirical problem is to distin-
guish between changes in the markup and changes in the marginal product of labor due
to cyclical uctuations in the rate of unobservable capacity utilization rates and techni-
cal progress. This paper has used a method to jointly recover empirical measures for all
three of these quantities from the loglinearized versions of optimizing rst order condi-
tions from a standard business cycle model with endogenous utilization and monopolistic
competition.
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We have applied this methodology to a panel VAR with annual OECD country data
and found that there is a strong and signicant reduction in the markup ratio in response
to an increase in government spending. The conditionally countercyclical markup response
is qualitatively robust to variations in crucial parametric assumptions. This result lends
empirical credibility to countercyclical markup theories of scal transmission. Further-
more, we also found that the response of hours worked to a government spending shock is
surprisingly weak and hardly signicant, if at all positive. While this casts doubt on the
standard view of scal transmission, which explains a sizeably positive output response
to higher public spending through the positive reaction of labor input, we suggest that
the missing link appears to be a strongly positive reaction of capital utilization. Thus, a
theoretical explanation of the transmission of shocks to government spending should ac-
count for the simultaneous negative reaction of markups and the positive reaction of factor
utilization rates. The development of such a theoretical model that to our knowledge does
not currently exist seems to be a fruitful eld for further research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data
The countries included in the panel are all OECD countries for which all data were available
for the period 1970 to 2008. These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Germany has been left out to avoid problems with structural breaks due to unication.
The data are taken from four sources: the European Unions Directorate General for
Economics and Finance Annual Macroeconomic Database (AMECO), the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the University of Groningens Growth
and Development Database (GGDC), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). All
data are retrieved from the respective publishing institutionswebsites, with the exception
of the IMF data, which are from the International Financial Statistics CD-ROM.
The (observable) variables entering the panel VARs are:
 yt: Real gdp per capita: Gross domestic product at 2000 market prices (AMECO),
divided by total population (AMECO).
 gt: Real government spending per capita: Final consumption expenditure of gen-
eral government at current prices (AMECO), divided by the price deator of gdp
(AMECO), and divided by total population (AMECO).
 ct: Real private consumption per capita: Private nal consumption expenditure at
2000 prices (AMECO), divided by total population (AMECO).
 dt: Government debt to output ratio: mostly general government consolidated gross
debt (percentage of gdp at market prices) (AMECO), exceptions see below.
 Rt: Real interest rate: Long term government bond yields (IMF, International Fi-
nancial Statistics, except for Finland and Spain. For these countries, the IMF data
are missing and the long term interest rate from the OECD Main Economic Indica-
tors was used instead), less growth rate of price deator of gdp (AMECO).
For the construction of markups and utilization rates, we need data on real wages,
hours worked, and the capital stock (and output yt):
 wt: Real wage rate: Compensation of employees (AMECO), divided by the price
deator of gdp (AMECO), divided by total annual hours worked (GGDC).
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 nt: Hours: Total annual hours worked (GGDC).
 kt: Capital stock: Net capital stock at 2000 prices, total economy (AMECO).
For some countries for which AMECO data has not been available, the debt-to-output
ratio has been taken from the OECD Economic Outlook Database 85, http://stats.oecd.org/
Index.aspx (general government gross nancial liabilities, as a percentage of gdp). These
countries are Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, and France. For Australia, the net
debt as a percentage of gdp has been taken from the countrys treasury website at
http://www.budget.gov.au/2008-09/content/fbo/html/appendix_b.htm.
In some cases, minor data adjustments have been made: 1) the capital stock series for
Australia and New Zealand lack entries for 2007 and 2008; the missing values were ex-
trapolated by tting and forecasting a quintic time trend to each series, 2) the Portuguese
nominal interest rate is missing for 1974 and 1975; it has been interpolated linearly, 3)
the Portuguese debt-to-output ratio is missing for 1973; the value for 1974 has been used
instead , 4) the gross debt level (gross sovereign issued debt), and consequently the debt-
to-output ratio, for New Zealand has been taken directly from the countrys treasury
website; the observations for 1970 and 1971 were missing and were set to the value of
1973.
All results have been checked for robustness in the following sense: we arrive at the same
conclusions as presented in the main text when we drop Australia, Luxembourg, Portugal,
and New Zealand from the sample (which are the countries for which data adjustments
have been made). The same holds if any single country out of these is excluded from the
analysis.
A.2 Construction of markup, utilization, and technology series
The relevant theoretical restrictions are (3), the aggregate version of (4), as well as (5)
and (6). These equations are repeated here for convenience:
rt = a
0(ut) = u
 
t ; (8)
yt = ztF (utkt; nt); (9)
ztF2(utkt; nt) = twt; (10)
ztF1(utkt; nt) = trt: (11)
These are 4 equations in the 8 variables rt; kt; ut; t; nt; yt; wt; zt. If we treat nt; kt; yt; wt
as observable and replace rt by (8) in (11), we can use these equations to empirically
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identify the unobservables ut; t; zt. We do so via a log-linear approximation. Following
the method of Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1999), loglinearizing along a balanced
growth path yields: (everything that does not carry a time index is a constant evaluated
at the balanced growth path):
brt =  but;bt + bwt = cF2t + bzt;bt + brt = cF1t + bzt;byt = bFt + bzt:
Note that
bFt = F1uk
F
(but + bkt) + F2n
F
bnt + bzt;
cF1t = F11ukF1 (but + bkt) + F12nF1 bnt;cF2t = F21ukF2 (but + bkt) + F22nF1 bnt:
From constant returns to scale in production we have for the elasticities
F12n =  F11uk;
F12uk =  F22n;
such that
cF1t = F12nF1 (bnt   but   bkt);cF2t = F12ukF2 (but + bkt   bnt):
Further note that constant returns implies for the elasticity of substitution :
1

=
FF12
F1F2
:
Therefore, the elasticities needed above are
F12n
F1
=
1

F2n
F
;
F12uk
F2
=
1

F1uk
F
:
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Further, we know that
w = F2z ) F2n
F
= 
wn
y
= sL;
r = F1z ) F1uk
F
= 
ruk
y
= sK ;
where sL and sK are the constant shares of labor and capital income in production along
the balanced growth path, respectively.
Thus, we nally have
brt =  but;bt + bwt = sK (but + bkt   bnt) + bzt;bt + brt = sL (bnt   but   bkt) + bzt;byt = sK(but + bkt) + sLbnt + bzt:
Writing the above in matrix form and substituting out brt =  but gives
0BB@
butbtbzt
1CCA =
0BB@
 sK 1  1
sL
 +  1  1
sK 0 1
1CCA
 10BB@
0  sK sK  1
0 sL  sL 0
1  sL  sK 0
1CCA
0BBBBB@
bytbntbktbwt
1CCCCCA ;
which is equation (7) in the main text.
Thus, given a vector of the period t observations on byt; bnt;bkt; bwt, we can infer the
period t values of the unobservables but; bt; bzt if we choose values for the steady state
elasticities: ; ;  ; sL, and sK = (1  sL) =. For the empirical work, we interpret the
hatted observable variables byt; bnt;bkt; bwt as log-deviations from deterministic time trends,
such that for any variable bxt = ln(xt=x). The levels of the variables can be recovered as
xt = exp (bxt) =x. The constant steady state levels needed to perform these calculations
are chosen as discussed in the main text.
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A.3 Markup series
The next two gures display the markup series t obtained using the approach outlined
in Section A.2, for the benchmark parameter set  = 0:5 and  = 1: Note that while the
level of the average markup is imposed a priori, the uctuations visible in the gures are
not.
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Figure 5: Markup series for the benchmark parameter set, part I
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Figure 6: Markup series for the benchmark parameter set, part II
25
A.4 Comparison of di¤erent estimation techniques for the panel VAR
Figure 7 displays the impulse resonse functions to a one percent shock to government
spending obtained using the bias-corrected xed e¤ects estimator developed by Hahn and
Kuersteiner (2002) (solid lines; these are the same results as displayed in gure 1) and the
corresponding results obtained using the simple xed e¤ects estimator (solid lines marked
with an asterisk).
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Figure 7: Comparison of IRFs obtained using the simple xed e¤ects estimator and the
bias-corrected xed e¤ects estimator developed by Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002).
26
 
 
 
